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Abstract
The ownership structure o f  the Indonesian Listed 
Companies tends to be concentrated, and fam ily is the 
dominant controller. The fam ily domination causes agency 
problem to non-family investor. By investigating the same 
sample o f  listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in 
1996 and in 2000, this research discovers that the 
reduction o f fam ily ownership will decrease agency 
problem. The optimal portion, the reduction o f  fam ily  
ownership 20,0%. However, after achieving that portion, 
the reduction o f fam ily ownership will increase the agency 
problem. This research also finds that fam ily is not the best 
controller. Meanwhile the bonding mechanism that 
effectively reduce agency problem is the increasing of 
dividend payment, not be increasing o f  debt.
Key words : agency problem, family ownership 
domination, bonding affectivity.
Introduction
In general, the ownership o f listed companies tends to be concentrated in which 
family and financial institution is the main controller. This phenomenon is not 
only occurring in the developing countries but also in the advanced countries 
by the exceptions o f the United States of America and the United Kingdom. A 
survey conducted by La Porta at al ( 1999 ) in 27 advanced countries found that 
o f  64% o f  listed companies that have concentrated, 30% o f  them is controlled 
by family.
In Indonesia, most o f  listed companies are also concentrated owned by family. 
A Survey conducted by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang ( 2000 ) found that
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family owns 71,5% o f Indonesian listed companies. Is there any problem due to 
the ownership structure? Kurniawan and Indriantoro ( 2000 ) argued that due to 
the family domination in Indonesian listed companies is one o f  the factors why 
the application o f  good corporate governance have not effective yet in 
Indonesia. They argue that if Indonesian listed companies are still dominated 
by family, the protection o f  minority investors will be remaining weak.
Conflict o f  interest between minority investors and the dominant family 
investor is one o f  versions in agency problem, and the scholar has not given 
proper intention. They frequently investigate the conflict o f  interest between 
investors and manager. This is because most o f  researches are conducted in the 
US and the UK in which agency problem emerges between investors and 
manager. Therefore the mechanism that theoretically and empirically was 
proved to reduce agency problem must be tested in Indonesia. Bonding 
mechanism by increasing dividend or debt suggested by Jensen ( 1986 ) has not 
effective applied in Indonesia.
By using data o f  the United States Listed companies, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argued that monitoring cost to reduce agency problem in companies 
controlled by family tends to be lower than controlled by non-family. 
Meanwhile McConoughy et al ( 2001 ) found that family-controlled companies 
tends to have higher market to book value o f  equity than that o f  non-family’s 
controlled companies. If  we do not investigate the difference o f  ownership 
structure from both findings, we will have misperception that the family- 
controlled companies are more effective than non-family’s controlled 
companies to overcome agency problem in Indonesia as Kurniawan and 
Indriantoro ( 2000 ) hypothesized.
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By using listed companies in 1996 and 2002, this study found that the reduction 
o f  family ownership in the beginning what would decrease agency problem. 
However after achieving the given portion, the decreasing o f  family ownership 
portion will increase agency problem. This research also finds that in 
overcoming the agency problem, family’s controlled companies is not as good 
as o f financial institution companies and State’s controlled companies although 
it my have a bias in industrial advantage. In relation o f  bonding mechanism, 
this research found that, by increasing dividend, is effective to reduce agency 
problem. Moreover in 1996 the increasing o f  debt had caused the increasing 
agency problem.
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Family Ownership versus Manager Ownership
Jensen and Meckling ( 1996 ) in the US introduced systematical analysis on 
agency problem. They developed a model related to the manager ownership in 
which is managed. Jensen and Meckling defined a  as a portion o f  stock owned 
by manager. If a  = 1 the company is wholly owned by manager. Consequently 
he or she will bear all risk when the company is under performed. On the other 
side, if a  <1 the manager will bear the a  from its mistake, and the remaining (1 
- a  ) will be transferred by other investors. The lower the portions o f  her stock 
the smaller the attention to increase value o f the company. Moreover managers 
maybe take actions that give personal benefit by sacrificing other investors.
One o f mechanisms suggested to reduce agency problem between manager and 
investor is that manager must have higher portion o f stock. This is because the 
higher the portion, the more responsible the manager to increase the value of 
companies.
This solution cannot be applied in Indonesia because there is a difference root 
o f  agency problem. In Indonesia, the portion o f manager is usually high 
because lie/she is also the member o f  family who control the company. To 
overcome the agency problem, the solution is not to increase the ownership 
portion but to reduce family's portion.
The question is why the family's portion must be reduced? Stulz ( 1988 ) 
improved the agency theory originated by Jensen and Meckling ( 1976 ). He 
argued that the relation between manager's ownership and value o f  company is 
non-monotonic. In the low a, the increasing o f  manager ownership tends to 
increase value o f  the company. Conversely when a  is high, the increasing the 
manager ownership will increase agency problem, in turn, it the value of 
entrenchment, an ownership position in which manager is freely follow 
personal interest without any anxiety from strike from other investor through 
hostile take over or proxy fights. In the Indonesian cases, because family 
ownership portion is still in this position, the portion must be reduced to 
decrease agency problem.
The Influence of Family Ownership on the agency Problem
LA Porta et al ( 1999 ) and Claessens et al ( 2000 ) defined family as all 
individuals and companies whose ownership is documented, except the owners 
are listed companies, or financial institution. Individuals and companies who
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have so small ownership that cannot be documented is categorized as listed. 
These researches use this definition.
I his research classified family ownership portion to be 5 categories :
Less than 5,00%, 5,00% - 10,00, 10,01 -  20.00%, 20,01 -  50,00% and > 50%. 
Family ownership portion less than 5% is treated as reference group.
The increasing performance points out that the manager is able to minimize 
agency problem. In this research, the performance is measured by two proxy 
(1) weekly cumulative abnormal return for one year without dividend 
adjustment ( notify by CAR ) and (2), weekly cumulative abnormal return for 
one year with dividend adjustment ( notify by CARADJ ). Abnormal return is 
the difference actual return and market return. The using o f abnormal return as 
a proxy of companies performance is will represent the trading stock that is 
simiiar with a tournament. Every stock will “presence” as good as possible, and 
investor will act a “jury" that will determine which stock is the best. Stocks that 
have positive abnormal return will have better performance. Conversely when 
the stocks have negative abnormal return, it has bad performance.
The test model o f the influence family ownership on the reduction agency 
problem uses two control variables that are market value o f equity ( MVE ) and 
book to market value o f equity ( BME ). The using market value o f  equity as a 
control variable is based on previous research in which market value o f  equity 
has significantly influence on return o f company ( Kim, Lee, and francis, 1988; 
Cruthley and Hansen, 1989; Volpin, 2002; and Milton, 2002 ). Where as Fama 
and French ( 1992 ) added BME as a variable that influence return o f  company.
The research investigates listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in early 
1996 and still listed until the end of 2002, and the analysis is conducted only 
for the year o f  1996 and 2002. The using of 1996 as an early analysis is to have 
description the relationship of pattern family ownership and the reduction 
agency problem before economic crisis, while the using o f  2002 data is to show 
the relationship that pattern after economic crisis. In the early 1996, there were 
238 companies listed in Indonesia Stock Market, but only 213 companies 
remain in the end o f  2000.
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Table 1 : The Result of Relation Test Between Family Ownership and 
The Reduction of Agency Problem
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Model : CARi = a + pi DOWN2 1 + p2 DOWN2 + p3 DOWN3i + p4 DOWN4 I + 
y 1 LnSize i + y 2 BME i -+
( 1 )
Where, CAR is weekly cumulative abnormal return for 1 year, CARADJ is 
cumulative abnormal return with dividend, DFOWN 1 is dummy variable that 
has “ 1” mark for the company that have family ownership 5-10%, DOWN2 is 
for ownership portion 10,1 -20% . DOWN3 is for 20,1-50%, DOWN4 is for 
>50% ownership, LnSize is In o f  market value o f equity, BME is book to 
market value o f  equity, DYEAR is dummy variable with “O ” mark for 1996 
and “ 1” for 2000. The following table points out the influence family 
ownership portion on the reduction o f agency problem.
Independence
Variable
Dep. Var : 
CAR
Dep. Var : 
CARADJ
Koef Prob Koef Prob
C -2.1748 0.036 -1.9877 0.058
DOWN 1 0.2562 0.421 0.2181 0.498
DOWN2 0.7123 0.051 0.6588 0.074
DOWN3 0.0747 0.537 0.1567 0.255
DOWN4 0.0524 0.603 0.0280 0.784
LSIZE 0.3842 0.019 0.3609 0.030
LSIZEA2 -0.0183 0.004 -0.0174 0.007
BME 0.0059 0.181 0.0063 0.160
DYEAR 0.0915 0.132 -0 .0119 0.846
Empirical test model used had been changed from the initial model. This is 
because RAMSEY test points out that the initial model has experienced the 
specification mistake on InSize variable, hence this was modified by adding 
InSizeA2. The using White -  heteroskedasticity test does not show any 
heteroscedasticity in this model. Meanwhile autocorrelation test using Ljung- 
Box Q Statistics points out there is no autocorrelation within the model.
Table 1 points out that the using either dependent CAR variable or CARADJ 
gives the similar result. This show that performance proxy used in this research 
is reliable. Both model show that DOWN2 coefficient is positive significant, 
while dummy variable for family ownership is not significant. These finding
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show that family ownership between 10.1 -  20% is the best portion to reduce
agency problem.
The investigation on dummy coefficient points out that DOWN4 < DOWN 3 < 
DOWN2 .> DOWN1. This pattern interprets that the decreasing o f  family 
ownership in the beginning will reduce agency problem, but after reaching 
beyond portion of 10,1 -  20.0%, the reduction family ownership will increase 
agency problem.
The influence o f economic crisis on the degree of relationship between the 
reduction family ownership and the reduction agency problem is relatively 
constant. This is shown by year dummy variable o f  BME is not significantly 
mfluence cumulative abnormal return. Where as the size of company have 
parabolic significant influence on cumulative abnormal return. This finding 
points out that the big-size companies are not able to companies with small-size 
companies because the growth rate the small companies are higher than that of 
large-size companies, the small-size companies are more able to create added 
value.
To test robustness the finding, the research modifies definition o f  family with 
another modification. First, family defined by only individual whose ownership 
is recorded. Consequently the ownership of closed-company is excluded from 
this criterion. Second, family is defined as one individual or company whose 
ownership is dominant. This definition is used to avoid the possibility not to 
have family relationship between individual component and the form.
B\ using both modified family definitions, it is still found that the pattern that 
the reduction o f  family ownership in the beginning can be able to reduce 
agency problem, but after reaching a specific portion the reduction o f  family 
ownership will make agency problem increases. The emerging difference on 
the modify family definition is on gradation degree o f reduction and the 
increasing agency problem when the family ownership decrease. In the family 
definition that only includes ndividual ownership. This finding indicates that 
the* relation family ownership that consists of individuals is more closely than 
those companies.
In the definition of family that include only one dominant owner among 
individual owners or companies, the degree of gradation o f decreasing / 
increasing agency problem because of the decreasing the family ownership is 
less than those other definition. Even with the definition hypothesizing inter­
component family ownership is independent, it is not found that ownership 
portion that is significantly the decreasing its agency problem is better than 
other ownership is independent is bias. The decreasing o f only one owner is not
22 B ad B oard Governance, Fam ily Domination, ...
Vol. 12, No. 2, December 2004
© Centre for Indonesian Accounting and M anagement Research
Postgraduate Program, Brawijaya University
The International Journal o f Accounting and Business Society 23
cause the decreasing agency problem significantly because other owner is not 
decrease.
Family Domination versus Non-Family Domination and the reduction 
agency problem.
This research finds that in 1996, as many as 85.85% o f  listed companies are 
controlled by family. 9.91% by listed company, 1.89% by State, 1.89% by 
financial institutions, and the remaining o f 0.47% has no dominant controller. 
The control definition used in the research is 20% while the family definition 
used in this research is the definition that includes all individual and closed- 
company. In 2000, the condition was changed. Companies controlled by 
family, listed company and financial institution decrease to 84,06%,7.73%, and 
0.97% respectively, and companies controlled by State and no dominant control 
increases to 4,48% and 2.42% respectively.
The reality that almost all listed companies in Indonesia has dominant 
controller raises a question; “Who are the best controller that is able to reduce 
agency problem?’ Table 2 points out the result o f  regression model including 
dumYny variable on family contro (DFOWN), financial institution control 
(DIOWN), State control (DSOWN), listed company control (DCOWN),and the 
group o f  companies having no dominant control as reference group.
Table 2 points out that the family-controlled companies are not significant to 
reduce agency problem. This result is different with companies that have no 
dominant controller. Even when dependent variable CAR used, coefficient 
DFOWN is negative. It indicates that the family-controlled companies tend to 
be worse in decreasing agency problem although the vale is not significant. 
From the table also indicates that listed controlled is as bad as family-controlled 
companies in overcoming agency problem. Meanwhile State-controlled 
companies and fnancial institution-controlled companies have better 
performance to handle agency problem. From year dummy coefficient points 
out that in general the handling agency problem by those controller tended to 
be worsen in 2002.
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Table 2 : The result of test of the influence of family domination
Onership and non-family ownership on the reduction of 
Agency problem
Model : CARi = a  + (31 DFOWNi + (32 DIOWNi + (33 DSOWNi + (34 DOWNi 
+ y 1 LnSizei + y 3 LnSizeA2i + DYEARi
( 2 )
where CAR is weekly cumulative abnormal return for 1 year, CARDJ is 
cumulative abnormal return with dividend, DFOWN 1 is dummy variable that 
has 1 mark for the company that have family ownership DIOWN is dummy 
variable that has 1 mark is controlled by financial institution, DSOWN is 
variable that has 1 mark when State control, DCOWN is variable that has 1 
mark when listed company, InSize is In market value o f  equity, BME is book to 
market value o f  equity, DYEAR is dummy variable that has null mark for 1996 
and 1 mark for 2000.
Indep. Var. Dep. Var : CAR Dep. Var :CARADJ
Koef Prob Koef Prob
C -2.3846 0.031 -2.3982 0.033
DFOWN -0.1202 0.729 0.0675 0.848
DIOWN 0.4456 0.247 0.6516 0.096
DSOWN 0.7155 0.028 0.8990 0.006
DCOWN -0.1774 0.630 0.0088 0.981
LSIZE 0.4519 0.007 0.4257 0.013
LSIZEA2 -0.0213 0.001 -0.0202 0.002
BME 0.0058 0.187 0.0055 0.210
DYEAR 0.6983 0.010 -0.7671 0.005
The Finding fam ily controlled companies are not different not or even worse 
than reference group (companies without dominant control) is consistent with 
previous finding. The decreasing o f fam ily ownership than can be able to 
reduce agency problem  must be up to 10,1-20% portion. However, when the 
portion on the ownership increases the agency problem  is also increase 
Comparing fam ily ownership 20% or more and companies having fam ily  
ownership 20% or less. Because part o f  reference group consist o f  companies 
that has the most conducive to decrease agency problem  (that is fam ily  
ownership o f  10,1-20%), it is clear that fam ily-controlled company is worse 
than companies in the reference group.
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How with a finding that listed-controlled companies are not significantly 
difference with reference group? The listed companies controlled by listed 
companies have the same characteristic with family-controlled company. In 
addition, financial institution-controlled company, using CARADJ dependent 
variable, is probably caused by the more independent it has than family control 
companies. Other possibility is any divided bias included in measuring 
CARADJ. This is because the long-team investors tend to expect dividend 
rather than capital garn.
The finding that state-controlled company is better to decrease agency problem 
must be interpreted cautiously. The advantage o f state control in only occurs is 
only on state listed companies. The agency problem that has been reduced is 
limited only on the conflict between state majority owner and other minority 
investor, not between state and other stakeholders. In addition, the possibility 
that state o f any bias industrial characteristic o f the listed state owned company.
Bonding Effectiveness in The Indonesian Capital m a rk e t .
Jensen (1986) argued that bonding mechanism used to reduce agency problems 
is by making decisions that reduce free cash flow. The smaller cash flow the 
smaller opportunity to use the cash flow for personal interest. On the other 
words agency problem will decrease when the free cash flow smaller.
There are two ways to reduce free cash flow that is by increasing debt and by 
increasing dividend payment. The more debt, the more funds used to pay 
principle and interest. Whereas, the more dividends paid, the smaller fund 
available to finance company operation.
The result o f  empirical test for dividend and debt bonding affectivity in 
Indonesian Capital Market is shown in Table 3.
Table 3 The Result Of Dividend And Debt Bonding Effectiv eness
Model : CAR=a + p4 DER + p2DY + p3(DFOWN *DER) + p4(DFOWN *DY)
Lnsize+1 jBMEi + s  '
Where CAR is weekly commutative abnormal return for 1 year. DER is debt to 
equity ratio. By is dividend yield. DFOWN is dummy variable that has 1 mark 
for family-owned company, in Size is In Market value o f equity. BEM is book 
to market value of equity.
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Dep V ar : C ar Dep. V ar : CARADJ
Van Koef Prob Koef Prob
C -1.7215 0.070 -1.5102 0.103
DER -0.0512 0.046 -0.0513 0.037
DY 1.9679 0.068 2.7173 0.019
DFOWNDER 0.0527 0.035 0.0505 0.026
DFORWN*DY 0.7297 0.612 0.8043 0.600
LSIZE 0.3187 0.038 0.2837 0.062
LSIZENG -0.0166 0.010 -0.0142 0.021
BME 0.0059 0.033 0.0056 0.074
DYEAR -0.0281 0.694 -0.1477 0.058
DYEAR*DER 0.0442 0.091 0.0442 0.110
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Notes :
The Model with dependent variable CAR uses white Heteroscedasticity 
Consistent Standard Error & Covariance coefficient. While model with 
dependent variable CARADJ uses Newey-West Standard Error & Covariance 
coefficient.
Table 3 points out that DER coefficient is negative significant. This means that 
in 1996 the increasing o f debt is not only effective to reduce agency problem.
But also it increases agency problem. This inconsistent finding with the agency 
theory probably because the debt is obtained from the bank under the same 
group o f the company. Therefore the credit feasibility and monitoring the use of 
debt is week
Mean white . DFOWS*DER is positively significant. This indicates the 
negative effect from the increasing debt tend to be neutralized when the 
company controlled by family. The positive coefficient o f  DYEAR* DER points 
out that in 2000. the negative affect o f increasing debt is significant decrease. 
M oreover in the family-owned company the influence o f  debt is change to be 
positive to reduce agency problem.
Fable 3 also points cut that DY coefficient is positively significant. This 
indicate that in general the in general the increasing of div idend is effective to 
decrease agency problem either in 1996 or 2000. The exclusion of 
DYEAR*DY variable in the Forward Method analysis model is a proof that 
there is no difference pattern and intensity o f influence increasing o f dividend 
payment on the reduction of agency problem between 1996 and 2000. In 
addition, positive DFOW'N*DY coefficient but not significant indicates that by 
increasing dividend in the family controlled company is more effective than 
non-family controlled company. However the differences o f  affectivity is not 
significant.
Vol. 1 2. No. 2. December  2004
© Centre for Indonesian Accounting and Management Research
Postgraduate Program, Brawijaya University,
Conclusions
Agency problem o f  listed companies in Indonesia can be decreased when the 
family dominated ownership is reducing. Every reduction o f  family ownership 
can decrease agency problem, however the optimal reduction is between 10.1 
% - 20%. The portion is the best ownership because the more reduction o f  the 
ownership it tends to increase agency problem.
Family is not the best controller compared to listed company, financial 
institution or state. Even financial institution and state tend to have better 
control on agency problem than family control although there is bias on 
industrial advantageous on the listed State Owned Company.
Bonding mechanism by increasing debt is clearly not effective to decrease 
agency problem. In 1996 the debt increasing has increase agency problem. In 
addition bonding by increasing dividend in general is effective to decrease 
agency problem.
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